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Abstract—I/O caching techniques are widely employed in enterprise storage systems in order to enhance performance of I/O intensive
applications in large-scale data centers. Due to higher performance compared to Hard Disk Drives (HDDs) and lower price and non-
volatility compared to Dynamic Random-Access Memories (DRAM), Flash-based Solid-State Drives (SSDs) are used as a main media in
the caching layer of storage systems. Although SSDs are known as non-volatile devices but recent studies have reported large number of
data failures due to power outage in SSDs. To overcome the reliability implications of SSD-based I/O caching schemes, RAID-1 (mirrored)
configuration is commonly used to avoid data loss due to uncommitted write operations. Such configuration, however, may still experience
data loss in the cache layer due to correlated failures in SSDs. To our knowledge, none of previous studies have investigated the reliability
of SSD-based I/O caching schemes in enterprise storage systems.
In this paper, we present a comprehensive analysis investigating the reliability of SSD-based I/O caching architectures used in enterprise
storage systems under power failure and high-operating temperature. We explore variety of SSDs from top vendors and investigate the cache
reliability in mirrored configuration. To this end, we first develop a physical fault injection and failure detection platform and then investigate
the impact of workload dependent parameters on the reliability of I/O cache in the presence of two common failure types in data centers,
power outage and high temperature faults. We implement an I/O cache scheme using an open-source I/O cache module in Linux operating
system. The experimental results obtained by conducting more than twenty thousand of physical fault injections on the implemented I/O
cache with different write policies reveal that the failure rate of the I/O cache is significantly affected by workload dependent parameters.
Our results show that unlike workload requests access pattern, the other workload dependent parameters such as request size, Working
Set Size (WSS), and sequence of the accesses have considerable impact on the I/O cache failure rate. We observe a significant growth
in the failure rate in the workloads by decreasing the size of the requests (by more than 14X). Furthermore, we observe that in addition to
writes, the read accesses to the I/O cache are subjected to failure in presence of sudden power outage (the failure mainly occurs during
promoting data to the cache). In addition, we observe that I/O cache experiences no data failure upon high temperature faults.
Index Terms—Flash-Based Solid-State Drives (SSDs), Storage Systems, I/O Cache, Reliability Analysis, Power Outage.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Increasing the I/O intensive applications such as Online Trans-
action Processing (OLTP) and banking services makes storage
subsystems built upon Hard Disk Drives (HDDs) as the perfor-
mance bottleneck of enterprise systems. In order to alleviate the
performance shortcomings of HDD-based storage subsystems,
enterprise manufacturers such as Dell EMC, NetApp, and HP
[1–3] and emerging storage architectures [4–6] employ high
performance flash-based devices such as enterprise Solid-State
Drives (SSDs) as a cache layer for disk subsystem, which is
mainly composed from low-performance HDDs and mid-range
flash-based SSDs (as depicted in Fig. 1). SSDs are non-volatile
devices which because of their non-mechanical design provide
higher performance and lower power consumption compared to
HDDs [5, 7–10]. In addition, SSDs cost about 20X lower than
volatile Dynamic Random-Access Memories (DRAMs) and also do
not require additional peripherals such as backup batteries to
retain data in case of power outage [11].
Employing SSD-based I/O caches in enterprise storage sys-
tems can enhance the performance of I/O intensive applications.
In such SSD-based I/O cache architecture, however, the SSD
cache becomes the single point of failure because of buffering
write pending requests where any failure in the SSD device
leads to data loss. Although SSDs are known as non-volatile
devices but recent studies such as [12–14] have reported different
types of failures such as data, metadata, and device failures in
the SSDs under power outage. To enhance the reliability of I/O
cache and reduce the probability of data loss, enterprise storage
systems such as Dell EMC and HP employ Redundant Array of
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Independent Disks (RAID) [15] in the configuration of I/O caches
[1, 3]. In such architecture, multiple SSDs are typically configured
as RAID-11 in the cache layer of enterprise storage systems (Fig.
1). Such configuration improves both performance and reliability
but cannot completely resolve the reliability issues at the RAID
level. The mirrored configuration keeps two copies of each data in
two different devices known as primary and secondary disks (i.e.,
primary is the one that the RAID controller chooses to write first)
and provides high level of reliability upon disk failures [15–21].
For each write request coming from the application, two identical
write operations are performed in both primary and secondary
disks. RAID-1 configuration doubles the read performance of the
disk subsystem by involving only one of the disks which has
a minimum queue size and service time for read operations.
Such configuration tolerates disk failures in the subsystem while
data failures such as shorn writes (i.e., incomplete writes), flying
writes (i.e., misplaced writes), and unserializablity (i.e., out-of-
order writes) reported in [12–14, 22] cannot be tolerated com-
pletely [15–21]. However, a process namely inconsistency check or
scrubbing runs in the background and regularly checks the con-
sistency of primary and secondary disks in RAID configuration.2
In RAID-1 configuration, in case of inconsistency (i.e., when the
comparison of primary and secondary disks fails), the data of
primary disk is copied to the secondary disk. Such operation
may destroy the correct data stored in the secondary disk by a
faulty data block in the primary disk (this issue happens when
data failure is occurred in the primary disk) [23].
Recent studies such as [12–14] have only investigated the
impact of power outage on the failures of SSDs while they have
neglected the impact of other parameters affecting the reliability
1. RAID-1, also known as mirrored configuration, replicates data blocks
in two or more paired devices.
2. In other types of RAID, consistency check operation checks the
correctness of stripes parity.
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Fig. 1: Overview of an enterprise storage system (SSD-M: Midrange-SSD and SSD-E:
Enterprise SSD).
of SSDs such as temperature. In addition, recent studies have only
focused on the reliability of SSDs in non-mirrored (single) config-
uration under power outage while the impact of such failures on
I/O cache architectures (commonly in RAID-1 configuration) has
been neglected. Furthermore, the previous studies do not emulate
the real power outage effect that occurs in data centers and ignore
the discharge delay of large-size embedded capacitors in Power
Supply Units (PSUs).
In this paper, we investigate the failures of SSD-based I/O
caches in RAID-1 configuration, which is widely used in en-
terprise storage systems under two common failure types in
data centers, i.e., power outage and high temperature faults. To do
so, we develop a reliability test platform including Hardware-
Software codesign which injects real faults that may occur in
data centers such as power outage and high temperature.3 We
integrate EnhanceIO as an open-source I/O cache module with
the kernel to implement the I/O cache level and analyze the
reliability of committed requests to the subsystem in presence of
I/O cache. We classify different types of failures into 1) False Write
Acknowledge (FWA) in which the data is not written in the SSD
while the acknowledgment is received in the application level, 2)
Full Data Corruption (FDC) in which entire data is corrupted. 3)
shorn writes (i.e., incomplete writes) in which only a portion of
data is written in the SSD, 4) flying writes (i.e., misplaced writes)
where the write operation is performed in a wrong address, 5)
unserializability issue which is due to the concurrent writes from
different threads to an identical address, and 6) I/O error (i.e.,
failures due to disk unavailability) in the disk subsystem. Fur-
thermore, the proposed test platform measures the temperature,
current, voltage, and power consumption of under test SSDs.
Using the proposed physical fault injection platform, we
conduct real experiments on more than 10 enterprise SSDs from
different vendors. In our experiments, we first study the impact
of workload dependent parameters such as 1) workload Working
Set Size (WSS), 2) request size, 3) request type, 4) access pattern,
and 5) sequence of the accesses on the ratio of different failures
on the I/O cache (including SSDs in mirrored configurations).
Second, based on the ratio of detected failures, we propose a
comprehensive classification of failures that occur in I/O caches
due to power outage. 4 Our results show that several workload
dependent parameters such as request size and workload WSS
have significant impact on the failure rate (about 14X and 44%,
respectively) while the others such as request access pattern does
3. Several recent works present test platforms and evaluate the reli-
ability and lifetime of other emerging technologies such as Thermally
Assisted Switching-Magnetic Random Access Memory (TAS-MRAM), Resis-
tive Random-Access Memory (RRAM) [24], and memristors [25]. Our work
mainly evaluates the reliability of SSDs.
4. In this work, we evaluate the impact of workload characteristic on
the reliability of I/O caches. Our initial experiments reveal different levels
of I/O cache reliability for various cache configurations such as write
policy (evaluated in this work), block size, and replacement policy. These
observations show the importance of assigning efficient cache configura-
tion for the applications based on their workload characteristics to get the
maximum reliability under power outage faults. The investigation of the
impact of cache configuration parameters on the reliability of I/O caches
will be considered as a future work of our study.
not considerably affect the failure ratio (only by 2%). In our
experiments, we observe no data failure in the I/O cache in
presence of high temperature faults. In addition, the experiments
reveal that both read and write requests fail upon power outage
in the I/O cache with different write policies such as 1) Write Back
(WB), 2) Write Through (WT), and 3) Read Only (RO).
The main contributions of this work are as follows.
• To our knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the
impact of power outage and high temperature faults which
commonly occur in datacenters on the SSD-based I/O cache
architectures in enterprise storage systems.5
• We develop a physical reliability test platform to inject power
outage and high temperature faults which can distinguish 1)
False Write Acknowledge (FAW), 2) Full Data Corruption (FDC),
3) shorn writes, 4) flying writes, 5) unserializable writes,
and 6) I/O error failures. The proposed test platform as
the first proposed physical framework measures the current,
temperature, and power consumption of the SSDs during
test.
• By conducting a set of extensive workloads, we study the
impact of workload dependent parameters such as 1) work-
load Working Set Size (WSS), 2) request size, 3) request type,
4) access pattern, and 5) sequence of the accesses on the
reliability of the SSD-based I/O cache architectures with
different write policies such as 1) Write Back (WB), Write
Through (WT), and Read Only (RO). We observe a significant
impact of workload dependent parameters such as request
size and workload WSS on the failure ratio in presence
of power outage fault. In addition, we observe that high
temperature faults have no impact on the failure of SSDs
in I/O cache layer of storage systems.
• We conduct real experiments on more than ten enterprise
SSDs from different vendors by injecting more than twenty
thousand of physical faults and examine the ratio of data
failures under different faults.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses related work. In Section 3, we characterize different
types of failure that occur on the SSDs. In Section 4, we present
our proposed test platform. Section 5 provides our proposed
evaluations and observations. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 RELATED WORKS
In this section, we first provide previous studies that investigate
the reliability of SSDs and flash-based devices. Then we present
the shortcomings of previous studies and show the key advan-
tages of our study.
Based on the source of failures, the previous studies on reliabil-
ity of flash-based devices can be investigated in two groups. The
first group analyzes the failure of the flash-based memories that
are mainly due to the internal structure of devices. Failures such
as endurance, read disturbance, and write disturbance that are
originated from the structure of flash-based devices (i.e., there
is no external reason for such failures), are studied in the first
group. The second group mainly focuses on the failures in the
flash-based devices that are mainly due to external events such
as power outage and other environmental reasons.
Previous studies such as [22, 26, 27, 30–36] mainly analyze the
failure of flash-based devices such as read disturbance, write dis-
turbance, and endurance. Such failures are commonly reported
in chip and device levels. SSD failures in Google and Facebook
datacenters during six and four years of operation are studied in
[26, 35]. Meza et al. observed similar “bathtube curve” in the
failure trend of SSDs and an additional phase namely “early
5. In this work, we target the impact of power outage and high
operating temperature on the reliability of I/O caches. Other important
parameters such as SSD aging can affect the reliability of data in SSDs,
which is partially reported in [22, 26–31].
3detection”. Life cycle of SSDs consists of four phases: 1) early
detection, 2) early failure, 3) usable lifetime, and 4) wear-out
phase. Meza et al. conclude that SSDs in their wear-out phase
do not experience a monotonic failure rate. In addition to [26],
other studies such as [33] observed more realistic results of SSD
failures in production environment.
The other parameters of flash-based memories such as per-
formance, power consumption, and reliability of devices are
measured in [32, 34]. The results reveal a significant difference
between the measured and reported values in the datasheets of
the products. The measured parameters are used to present the
most reasonable trade-off in the design of storage systems.
The impact of power outage in embedded systems is in-
vestigated in [37]. A software-based test platform is proposed
which mainly simulates the effects of power outage on the Flash
Translation Layer (FTL) of SSDs and file systems at the Operating
System (OS) layer. The proposed test platform is programmed to
detect a group of previously defined types of failures that occurs
during simulation. Such a platform neglects the effects of realistic
power failures and only is able to detect a limited number of
failures that may occur in simulation.
Recent studies such as [12, 13] have investigated the reliability
of flash cells and SSDs under power outage. Such studies have
proposed a test platform that injects realistic power outage faults
to the devices. Tseng et al. in [12] have proposed an FPGA-based
reliability test platform where the power of under test flash cells
is cut by high-speed transistors with less than 3.7µs delay. The
results of the experiments in [12] show several failures in the
flash cells (i.e., in the chip level design) due to power outage.
Such study investigates the reliability of flash cells in the chip
level design which neglects several recovery mechanisms that is
employed in device level designs such as SSDs.
In upper level designs of flash-based devices, most of chip
level failures are masked and would not result in data failure in
the application layer. However, such designs suffer from other
types of failure that may not occur in chip level and hence,
investigating the reliability of the SSDs (i.e., device level design)
is required. To this end, later studies such as [13] have evaluated
the reliability of SSDs under power outage.
Zheng et al. have proposed a reliability test framework that
explores the impact of realistic power outage faults on SSDs.
They have analyzed fifteen SSDs from five different vendors
and reported several failures for thirteen out of fifteen SSDs
[13]. Similar to previous studies, [13] neglects the impact of
workload dependent parameters on the failure ratio where they
only examine the reliability of SSDs under a fixed and simple
workload. In addition, the power failure is performed by high-
speed transistors where the input voltage of under test SSDs is
dropped to zero in microsecond-order delay. In such condition,
the impact of large size capacitors that are provided in Power
Supply Unit (PSU) is neglected where the SSDs under test do
not experience the real power outage process that occurs in the
systems. Experimental results in [14] show that the fall delay of
PSU output (voltage drop from 5v to 0) takes more than 900ms
where the SSDs become unavailable once the input voltage drops
to 4.5v that takes about 40ms.
The impact of workload dependent parameters on the failure
ratio is examined in [14] by injecting realistic power outage
failures. However, none of previous studies investigated the
impact of workload dependent parameters on the reliability
of SSD-based I/O caches in the enterprise storage systems in
the presence of realistic faults. In addition, the proposed test
platform in [14] does not provide the current, temperature, and
power consumption of the under test SSDs. Furthermore, [14]
neglects the impact of other common types of faults such as high
temperature on the failure of SSDs in datacenters.
3 FAILURE CHARACTERIZATION IN SSDS
In this section, we elaborate different types of failures that occur
in case of either power outage or high temperature (in Section
4.2, we will elaborate on how we detect the failures using our
proposed reliability test platform). Fig. 2 shows SSD failures and
their relation. As shown in Fig. 2, the failures are categorized in
three groups namely: 1) data failure, 2) I/O error, and 3) dead device.
Data failures may occur in five types: 1) False Write Acknowledge
(FAW), 2) unserilizable writes, 3) shorn writes, 4) flying writes, and
5) Full Data Corruption (FDC). In the following, we describe each
type of failure and demonstrate how such failures occur.
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Fig. 2: Different types of SSD failures.
3.1 Data Failure
Data failure occurs when the correct data becomes unavailable
after a successful write operation on the SSD. In the following,
we investigate data failures in five different groups.
1) False Write Acknowledge (FWA): This failure occurs when
we receive ACK in the application layer but the data is not
actually written in the SSD due to power outage. This failure
is mainly due to the volatile storage elements in the internal
data path within the control layer of SSDs such as host FIFO
buffer and DRAM cache [26, 28, 29, 38, 39].
2) Unesrilizable Writes: The most common host controller inter-
face which schedules the requests in SSDs is Advanced Host
Controller Interface (AHCI) [39, 40]. AHCI keeps I/O requests
received from OS in a single command queue namely Native
Command Queue (NCQ) in which the requests are queued
out-of-order to provide higher performance [39]. Such con-
dition raises challenging issues such as unserializable writes
where the random and unknown order of committed writes
on the SSD fail in presence of power outage which leads to
data loss.
3) Shorn Write: The SCSI layer of the Linux kernel partitions
each request into smaller sub-requests and commits them
into the disk subsystem. In this case, the sub-requests are
kept in DRAM buffer in the SSD internal data path where
sudden power outage may corrupt one or more of the sub-
requests. In this type of failure, some parts of an I/O request
are written to the SSD (NAND flashes) while others are not.
4) Full Data Corruption (FDC): In this type of failure, although
the write operation is completed in the SSD but the data
block (including all sub-requests) is corrupted. Such failure
differs from shorn writes since all sub-requests are failed. In
addition, due to different initial data and final written data,
such failure cannot be considered as FWA. This failure can
be due to 1) errors in volatile storage elements in the SSD
internal data path (such as host FIFO buffer and DRAM cache
[26, 28, 29, 38, 39]) and 2) errors in NAND flashes within the
SSD such as program errors [39].
5) Flying Write: This failure mainly occurs in HDDs, however,
it may also occur in SSDs. Flying writes in SSDs may be
due to the corruption of the SSD mapping tables which are
kept in internal DRAM to provide higher performance [26,
38]. In other words, in such type of failure, the correct data
is written successfully on a wrong address in presence of
power outage.
43.2 I/O Error
This type of failure is due to disk unavailability through ap-
plication during power outage. In this case, some of requests
are committed to the disk and ACK is received while we do
not receive ACK for the remaining requests. Such requests are
blocked until the disk becomes available and then committed to
the disk subsystem. In case of long unavailability, the application
receives a timeout response from the disk subsystem. Data failure
is occurred for the first group that the ACK is received but
because of disk unavailability during power outage, the data is
destroyed.
3.3 Dead Device
This type of failure occurs when the SSD becomes broken after
multiple power outages. In case of dead device failure, the
S.M.A.R.T report of the SSD provides details of the problem.
Dead device failure can be experienced in three modes namely: 1)
metadata corruption, 2) interface corruption, and 3) chip failure.
In the following, we elaborate different types of dead device
failure.
1) Metadata Corruption: This type of failure is due to the
problems that occurs for FTL of the SSDs after multiple
power outage. In such failure, the address map and mapping
algorithms which are done by the FTL are disrupted. When
this failure occurs, some address areas of the SSD become
unavailable through application.
2) Interface Corruption: Multiple power outages affect the
SCSI interface of SSDs (typically SATA or SAS) and disrupt
the operation of this part. When this failure occurs, the
SSD becomes unavailable through scsi scan commands from
the OS. In some cases, such interface problem affects the
controller of the motherboard where the other healthy disks
become unavailable. Such problem is resolved by system
reboot or disconnecting the faulty SSD from the system. In
this type of failure, the S.M.A.R.T report of the SSD includes
“scsi error badly formed scsi parameters” log.
3) Chip Failure: In this type of failure, the flash chips or internal
connections of the SSD are disrupted where the SSD is not
recognized by any controller.
4 PROPOSED RELIABILITY TEST PLATFORM
The proposed reliability test platform consists of HardWare Mod-
ule (HWM) and SoftWare Module (SWM) working together where
HWM is programmed and controlled by SWM. Fig. 3 shows
an overview of our proposed reliability test platform. SWM is
responsible for generating the I/O requests and scheduling fault
injections time intervals. HWM is programmed to receive com-
mands from SWM and inject physical faults to the SSDs. Finally,
SWM is used to detect data failure and device failures that are
occurred due to injected faults. In the following, we first describe
SWM and its components in Section 4.1 and then in Section 4.2
we elaborate the proposed failure detection algorithm. Finally,
we provide the structure of HWM in our proposed reliability test
platform in Section 4.3.
4.1 SoftWare Module (SWM)
SWM generates various workloads with defined parameters such
as request size, request type, access pattern, sequence of accesses,
and WSS and issues the I/O requests to the disk subsystem (i.e.,
HDD equipped with SSD-based I/O cache configuration).6 SWM
tracks the issued I/O requests and detects the parameters such
as issue time, completion time, request size, request type, and the
checksum of written data on disk. In addition, SWM keeps the
6. SSDs can be configured in different RAID levels, however, RAID-1
(mirrored) is the common RAID configuration for SSD-based I/O caches
[1, 3].
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Fig. 3: Overview of the proposed test platform.
information of the I/O requests in a database in two conditions:
1) before issuing the request to the disk subsystem and 2) after
issuing the I/O to the disk subsystem. 7 SWM is designed to
detect different types of failures (as discussed in Section 3) based
on the information that keeps in the database and the header
of the I/O requests. SWM 1) schedules fault injection intervals,
2) manages HWM to inject physical faults, and 3) receives the
information about SSDs power consumption, temperature, and
current.
As shown in Fig. 3, three main sub-modules in SWM namely
a) Scheduler, b) I/O Generator, and c) Analyzer perform 1) schedul-
ing faults, 2) submitting I/O requests to the disk subsystem, and
3) detecting failures, respectively. In the following, we describe
how each part of SWM works in more details.
4.1.1 Scheduler
Scheduler is responsible for determining the fault injection in-
tervals. It chooses random time instances that fault injection
will be occurred. Scheduler communicates with HWM and sends
On/Off Commands to HWM. It receives information such as 1)
temperature, 2) current, and 3) power consumption of the SSDs
from HWM. HWM waits to receive the commands from SWM
and turns the SSDs on or off based on Scheduler. In addition,
the Scheduler sets the temperature of the under test SSDs where
HWM increases or decreases the temperature of the SSDs. Based
on Scheduler’s command, HWM turns on or off the heater or the
fan to regulate the temperature of the test platform.
4.1.2 I/O Generator
I/O Generator creates different types of workloads with different
parameters such as 1) request size, 2) request access pattern, 3)
request type, 4) Working Set Size (WSS), and 5) sequence of the
accesses. Next, it commits the I/O requests of the workloads to
the disk subsystem. The generated requests are named as data
packets that are issued to the SSDs by the I/O Generator. The
structure of data packets is shown in Fig. 4. It can be seen that
a data packet consists of two parts: 1) header and 2) data. The data
which can include sub-requests is produced randomly and the
header includes the key information about data such as: 1) size,
2) destination address, 3) issue time (i.e., when the request enters
into the disk queue), 4) completion time (i.e., when the ACK of
7. Our proposed reliability test platform also is able to execute real
storage workloads, in which the information about requests including 1)
size, 2) address, 3) type, and 4) issue time are extracted from workload
trace.
5the request is received in the application layer), 5) checksum of
data before issuing the request, and 6) checksum of written data
to the disk subsystem (Table 1 provides the detailed information
about the content of data packet). The information in the header
of data packet is used in detecting different types of failures (in
future we elaborate the failure detection mechanism). Each sub-
request included in the data part of data packet consists of 1) ID,
2) size, 3) address, 4) checksum, and 5) data (as depicted in Fig. 4).
Data packets are stored in a database to be used in failure detection
phase.
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Fig. 4: Structure of data packets.
TABLE 1: Description of fields in data packet.
Field Description
Size The total size of I/O request.
Address Destination address of the I/O request.
Queue Time When the I/O request enters in disk queue.
Initial Checksum The checksum of destination address before issuingthe request.
Data Checksum The checksum of I/O request (including Data part).
Final Checksum The checksum of destination address after receivingACK
Complete Time When the application receives ACK from disk.
Sub Request i The i-th part of the request.
ID The sub-request number.
Sub Req Size The size of sub-request.
Sub Address The destination address of sub-request.
Sub Checksum The checksum of sub-request (only sub-data).
Sub Final Checksum The checksum of sub-request after completion.
Sub Data The data part of sub-request.
4.1.3 Analyzer
Analyzer keeps the track of I/O requests and verifies the correct-
ness of written data in the disk subsystem. Based on collected I/O
traces, Analyzer compares the checksum of “completed” requests
with the stored checksum of corresponding data packet in the
database. In case of any inconsistency, the Analyzer reports a data
failure. Analyzer employs blktrace as a block layer I/O tracing tool
to keep the track of the requests. Blktrace is available in Linux
kernel (version 2.6 and upper) and provides the information of
I/O requests in user level without any performance overhead.
Analyzer detects the other types of failures such as device failure
and I/O error beside data failures based on the collected infor-
mation by HWM. In Section 4.2, we elaborate how we trace the
I/O requests and detect different types of failures.
4.2 Failure Detection
In this section, we show how our proposed failure detection
algorithm of the test platform detects different types of failure.
To do so, we have employed an I/O tracing mechanism which
completely traces the I/O requests during running workloads.
Such mechanism works online and keeps the state of the I/O
requests in different levels. In order to track the I/O requests,
we employ the Linux comprehensive I/O tracing tools, namely
blktrace and blkparse providing required details of the request
without any performance overhead. In the post-process level, we
have employed a modified version of btt tool to extract addi-
tional information such as standard format of timing information
of the I/O requests. Such modification helps us in detecting
complete and incomplete I/O requests (we call a request as complete
when we receive the ACK of the request). To do so, we have
modified the operation of “–per-io-dump” option in btt. This
option extracts the trace of an individual I/O request where
such modification creates the trace of large size request that are
divided into “sub-requests” with the detailed timing information.
Failure detection process works based on the collected infor-
mation of the I/O requests in the header of the data packets. Note
that we have two versions of data packet: 1) the generated one by
the I/O Generator kept in database and 2) the written one in the
disk subsystem. We start failure detection process in two cases:
1) when we receive a request time out response and 2) when we
receive the ACK of a request (i.e., when the complete flag of the
request is set. A request is set to complete when all its sub-requests
are set as complete).
Algorithm 1 shows how we detect different types of data
failures in the platform. 8 First, in line 2 we check the timeout
response of the request. In case of timeout, we report I/O Error
in line 3. Then in line 5, we check the checksum of written data
(by comparing dataChecksum and finalCehcksum) to detect if
data failure is occurred or not. In case of equality, we mark the
data as correct and report “no failure”. Otherwise, in case of any
inconsistency between dataChecksum and finalCehcksum, in
line 6, we compare the finalChecksum with initialChecksum
of corresponding address (which was extracted before write op-
eration and kept in the database) to validate the write operation.
In case of equality, in line 7, we check whether multiple writes
are submitted to the disk subsystem. To do so, we check if the
sequence of the accesses is Write After Write (WAW) or not. If
so, the failure is due to Unserializability of two parallel write
accesses (line 8). Otherwise in line 11 we report False Write
Acknowledge (FWA) which is due to the fact that data is not
written in the SSD flash cells while we receive acknowledgment
in application level. Then in line 16 we check the correctness
of sub-requests and keep the number of failed sub-requests in
variable numOfFailedSubReqs. In line 20, if we find failed sub-
requests, we report Shorn Write. In line 23 in case of failure of all
sub-requests, entire data is corrupted and we report Full Data
Corruption (FDC). We report Flying write in line 26 in case of
inconsistency of sub-addresses and the address of I/O request.
To do so, we scan entire addresses of disk subsystem which takes
long time.
4.3 HardWare Module (HWM)
The structure of HWM in our proposed reliability test platform
is shown in Fig. 5. HWM is responsible for injecting real and
physical faults such as power outage and high temperature
failures. HWM receives the fault injection commands from SWM
through a USB connection. Fig. 5a shows the schematic of HWM
that injects physical power outage faults to the SSDs. It can be
seen that HWM is placed in the path of power lines of the SSDs
to perform real fault injections. Fig. 5b shows the schematic of
HWM which is responsible for high temperature fault injection.
It can be seen that HWM manages the heater and the fan to control
the temperature of the SSDs as assigned by SWM (Scheduler). The
physical view of the proposed reliability test platform is provided
in Fig. 5c and Fig. 5d.
HWM includes the following parts:
1) Atmega32 micro-controller embedded in an Arduino UNO
board. This micro-controller receives and decodes the com-
mands from SWM. It turns the power of SSDs on or off based
8. Detection of dead device failure (mentioned in Section 3.3) is mainly
performed in the hardware layer and needs further tests in separated
boards and is not performed within SWM.
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Fig. 5: Proposed reliability test platform (HWM).
on the received command in determined time instances.
In addition, the micro-controller is programmed to decode
the commands related to temperature, fan, and measuring
modules.
2) INA219 module is used for measuring the current and volt-
age of SSDs. This module measures and sends the current
of the SSDs to SWM and makes the SWM able to detect the
status and operation of the SSDs.
3) SRD24v relay which controls the power of the heater mod-
ule in the platform. This relay is controlled by the micro-
controller and turns the heater on or off in determined time
instances which is assigned by the micro-controller based on
the temperature of the SSDs.
4) LM35 sensor measures the temperature of the platform and
the SSDs. The information about temperature of the SSDs
are passed to SWM. SWM also receives the temperature
of the SSDs from S.M.A.R.T report provided by the SSD
manufactures.
5) The heater is responsible for injecting high temperature
faults to the SSDs. The employed heater is able to increase
the temperature up to 100 degrees Celsius in 5 minutes (in
such condition the temperature of the SSDs increases up to
70 degrees Celsius).
6) The fan is used to cool the platform and decrease the temper-
ature of the SSDs as determined by micro-controller during
high temperature fault injection.
HWM communicates with SWM (Host System) through a
USB serial connection. The embedded micro-controller in Ar-
duino UNO receives commands from SWM. The micro-controller
switches the power of SSD to ON or OFF state by controlling
the pin 16 of the ATX controller of the PSU which drives the
under test SSDs power. Pin 16 of the ATX controller is active
low and cuts off the output power of the PSU by applying a
high voltage (+5V). To inject the high temperature faults, micro-
controller manages the heater and fan to control the temperature
of the SSDs as SWM decides.
The proposed reliability test platform injects the real phys-
ical fault. To inject real power outage fault, we model the real
discharge delay of large size capacitors that are employed in
the PSU. By conducting several experiments, we observed the
impact of discharge delay of such capacitors on the input voltage
of SSDs. As depicted in Fig. 6, we observed the output voltage of
the PSU in different cases: 1) when the PSU drives no SSD (Fig.
6a) and 2) when the PSU drives two SSDs (Fig. 6b). The results
of the experiments reveal that the full discharge (5v to 0) delay of
the PSU takes about 1, 900ms when it drives two SSDs. The SSDs
become unavailable through the application layer (SWM in Host
System) when the input voltage drops to 4.5v during 5ms after
power fault injection.
5 EVALUATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the reliability of I/O cache including
SSDs in RAID-1 configuration and show the ratio of different
types of failures (described in Section 3) under power outage
and high temperature. To do so, we have conducted experiments
7Algorithm 1: Data failure detection algorithm
Input: initialChecksum , dataChecksum, finalChecksum, subChecksum,
numOfSubReqs, dstAddress
/* timeOut is the default parameter defined in linux
kernel for I/O requests. */
1 Function failureDetection is
/* First we check if the timout is occured or not. In
case of timeout, IO Error is reported. */
2 if responseT ime > timeOut then
3 Report IO Error.
4 end
/* We check the correctness of checksum: */
5 if finalChecksum ! = dataChecksum then
/* In case of inequality, data failure is
detected. Then we find the type of data
failure. */
/* We check if data is written in SSD or not? */
6 if initialChecksum == finalChecksum then
/* In this case, we recieve the ACK in
application level while the data is not
written in the SSD. */
/* If we have multiple writes from different
threads: */
7 ifWAW then
8 Report Unserializibility.
9 end
10 else
11 Report FWA.
12 end
13 end
/* We check the correctness of subrequests.
numOfFailedSubReqs shows the number of failed
subrequests. */
14 numOfFailedSubReqs = 0
15 for i = 0 to numOfSubReqs do
16 if subFinalChecksum ! = subDataChecksum then
17 numOfFailedSubReqs++
18 end
19 end
/* If we find any failed subrequest */
20 if numOfFailedSubReqs > 0 then
21 Report Shorn Write.
22 end
/* If all sub-requests are corrupted we have FDC.
*/
23 else if numOfFailedSubReqs == numOfSubReqs then
24 Report FDC.
25 end
26 if numOfFailedSubReqs == 0 and subAddress does not fit in
dstAddress then
27 Report Flying Write.
28 end
29 end
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5
vo
lta
ge
 (v
)
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6
Fall time: 1.92s
4.5
50
m
s
Close View
(a) When the PSU does not drive any device.
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4
vo
lta
ge
 (v
)
Time (s)
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 0.25  0.3  0.35  0.4  0.45  0.5  0.55
Time (s)
Fall time
4.5
Rise time<1ms
5ms
SSD turns off in V=4.5V
Close View
(b) When the PSU drives two SSDs in RAID-1 configuration.
Fig. 6: The output voltage of the PSU.
using a realistic fault injection platform on more than ten en-
terprise SSDs from different vendors where the detailed technical
information of the SSDs is provided in Table 2. Note that the SSDs
from type C support “power loss data protection” and hence
experience small number of failures compared to other SSD types.
The detailed information about Host System used as SWM in
the test platform is reported in Table 3. To implement I/O cache,
we use an open-source cache module, EnhanceIO, as a kernel
module where the under test SSDs in RAID-1 configuration are
used in the cache layer of HDD. The I/O cache is configured
with the Least Recently Used (LRU) replacement policy and the
block size is equal to 4KB. The total cache size is equal to 100 GB
(20% of disk space) to create promotion and eviction operations
on the cache. Note that in case of larger cache size, the cache
has enough space to serve all accesses with minimum (near zero)
miss ratio and eviction/promotion operation. In the following
experiments, the write policy is set to Write Back (WB) while
in Section 5.9, we configure the cache policy in three types of
WB, Write Through (WT), and Read Only (RO) to compare the
impact of cache write policy on the reliability. We implement
RAID-1 configuration using mdadm as a software-based RAID
management tool for Linux systems.
We perform experiments and examine the impact of workload
dependent parameters on the failure rate of the SSD-based I/O
cache (in RAID-1 configuration) in presence of power outage
and high operating temperature. We also study the impact of
1) workload WSS, 2) type of requests (read/write), 3) request
size, 4) requested Input Output Operation per Second (IOPS),
5) access pattern (random/sequential), and 6) sequence of the
accesses (i.e., Read After Read (RAR), Read After Write (RAW),
Write After Read (WAR), and Write After Write (WAR)). In each
experiment, we commit at least 24, 000 accesses and impose
600 faults into the SSDs. However, to investigate the impact of
workload characteristics, we perform multiple experiments that
increases the number of accesses and injected faults. 9 In the
following, we elaborate the experiments and report the impact
of above-mentioned parameters on the failure rate and the ratio
of different types of failures in presence of power outage and
high temperature.
5.1 Impact of Workload Working Set Size (WSS)
In this section, we evaluate the reliability of I/O cache to examine
the impact of workloads WSS on the ratio of different types of
failures. To do so, we perform ten experiments by using the
workloads with different WSSs. We change the workloads WSS
from 1GB to 350GB and measure the failure ratio under power
outage. In these experiments, the accesses are distributed in
uniform random pattern and the requests size varies between
4KB and 1MB. We issue more than 96, 000 writes to the disk
subsystem where the SSDs experience more than 2, 400 power
failures during the experiments.
The results of the experiments are shown in Fig. 7 (data failure
per power fault is shown in the right side axis). We make two
major observations: 1) the failure rate in the I/O cache increases
by 44% when we increase the WSS from 1GB to 350GB under
power failures that represents fewer failures in the workloads
with smaller WSS. This is due to the fact that the time intervals
between updating cache blocks in workloads with smaller WSS
is less than the workloads with larger WSS. In this case, the
written data resides in the cache for a short time where the
probability of power outage in a such short time is low. 2) We
do not experience unserilizable writes and flying writes failures
during these experiments.
We conclude that the workload with large WSS experiences
more data failure rate compared to the workloads with smaller
9. We mainly compare the number of failures per power fault that
reveals no dependency between the number of fault injection and average
number of data failures.
8TABLE 2: Specification of employed SSDs in the experiments (DWPD: Driver Write Per Day, UBER: Unrecoverable Bit Error Rate, MTBF: Mean Time Between Failures,
LDPC: Low Density Parity Check [10]).
SSD
Type Size $/GB
Bit
per
Cell
Release
Year
Read/Write
IOPS (4KB)
Sequential
Read/Write
(MB/s)
DWPD
Driver
Life Time
(TB)
UBER
MTBF
(Million
Hours)
Other Features
A 120 GB 0.5 TLC 2015 60/70 K 530/410 0.68 90 - 1.5 LDPC, SLC caching
B 120 GB 0.61 MLC NA 11.5/52 K 420/120 2.75 354 - 1.0 -
C 2 TB 0.69 MLC 2015 95/28 K 510/485 3.6 12, 320 10−17 2.0 Power loss data protection
D 2 TB 0.4 TLC 2016 93/24 K 540/520 0.9 3, 200 10−17 3.0 -
TABLE 3: HW and SW specification of Host System used in reliability test platform.
Hardware
Motherboard Z97-A from ASUSTeK corp.
CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i5
RAM 8GB DDR3 from Hynix Semiconductor
HDD
(OS) 7.2K RPM, 500GB from SEAGATE corp.
HDD
(Disk Subsystem) IntelliPower, 500GB from Western Digital
Under test SSDs According to Table 2
Software
OS Ubuntu 17.04
Kernel 4.10.0-19-generic
WSS. In this case, the failures from shorn write type become
dominant.
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Fig. 7: Impact of workload working set size on different types of failure.
5.2 Impact of Request Type
In this section, we conduct experiments to study the impact of
request types of the workloads on the ratio of different types of
failures in the I/O cache. To this end, we have performed five
experiments where we change the percentage of read operations
in the workloads from 0 to 100% and measure the failure ratio
under power outage. In these experiments, the WSS of the run-
ning workloads is set to 380GB and the accesses are distributed
in uniform random pattern. The requests size varies between
4KB and 1MB. We issue more than 150, 000 writes to the disk
subsystem where the SSDs experience more than 3, 000 power
failures during the experiments.
The results of the experiments are shown in Fig. 8 (data failure
per power fault is shown in the right side axis). We make four
major observations: 1) the failure rate decreases by increasing
the number of read operations in the workloads. 2) We observe
failures only from FDC type in the 100% read workload due to the
failure of write operations during promoting missed data blocks
into the I/O cache. 3) We observe no unserializable write and fly-
ing write types of failure. The reason behind zero unserializable
write failures is the workload type. We submit I/O requests with
uniform random access pattern that the likelihood of submitting
two consecutive write accesses in an identical address is low, and
hence we do not observe any unserializable write failures. 4) The
shorn write failures are the dominant type in these experiments.
We conclude that in the workloads with low number of read
operations, the I/O cache experiences more data failures. In
addition, in the workloads with large number of read operations,
sudden power outage corrupts the data blocks of I/O cache
(due to the corruption of write operations during promoting data
blocks).
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Fig. 8: Impact of request type on data failures.
5.3 Impact of Request Size
In this section, we evaluate the impact of request size of the
workloads on the ratio of different types of failures. To this end,
we have performed five experiments where the request size of
the workloads is fixed to 4KB, 16KB, 64KB, 256KB, and 1MB in
each experiment, and then we measure the failure ratio under
power outage. In these experiments, accesses are distributed in
uniform random pattern and the requests size varies between
4KB and 1MB. We issue more than 225, 000 writes to the disk
subsystem where the SSDs experience more than 4, 500 power
failures during the experiments.
Fig. 9 shows the results of these experiments (data failure
per power fault is shown in the right side axis). We make three
major observations: 1) the failure rate decreases by increasing the
request size of the workloads. 2) In the workloads with smaller
request size we do not observe shorn write while we experience
large number of FWA failures (we will elaborate this observation
in the description of Fig. 10). 3) We observe no failure from flying
write and unserializable write types.
Fig. 10 shows the percentage of FWA, shorn write, and FDC
failures based on the workloads request size. We observe that in
the workloads with average request size less than 480KB, the
FWA failure is dominant while in the workloads with larger
request size, the I/O cache experiences mainly shorn writes. This
is because to the fact that in the workloads with small writes,
large number of write pending request is buffered in the SSD
volatile elements within internal data path such as host FIFO
buffer and DRAM buffer [26, 28, 29, 38, 39] and hence, in this
case, power outage causes more FWA failures compared to the
other type of failures. On the other hand, in case of submitting
large size requests (larger than 500KB), the SSDs in the cache
layer experience higher number of shorn writes than FWA. This
observation also verifies the results of experiments presented
in Fig. 8. This is because shorn writes mainly occur due to an
interrupt (here power outage) during write operation. For large
size requests that the request is partitioned into multiple sub-
requests, in case of power outage, the committed sub-requests
before power outage will be completed while the operations
during power outage are failed leading to shorn write failure. In
contrast, small size requests finish and receive acknowledgment
in a short time and the likelihood of power outage during small
9size write operation is much less than large size accesses. Thus,
the number of shorn write failure in the workloads with large
size requests is higher than the workloads with small size write
accesses. In addition, in the workloads with larger request sizes,
we observe lower failures compared to workloads with smaller
request size. Finally, we observe increased failures from FDC type
in the large size request.
We conclude that the workloads with small random write
accesses experience large number of data failures under power
outage compared to the workloads with large request sizes.
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5.4 Impact of Requests Access Pattern (Ran-
dom/Sequential)
Here, we study the impact of workload access pattern on the ratio
of different types of failures in the I/O cache configuration. To
this end, we perform experiments with three different workloads
including random and sequential access patterns (including write
accesses with average request size equal to 512KB) and one
real storage benchmark, Cello99 (14-Jan), mainly including 8KB
partially sequential read and write accesses. Then we measure the
failure ratio under power outage. We commit more than 26, 000
write requests to the disk subsystem and inject more than 200
sudden power failures to the SSDs.
Fig. 11 shows the results of the experiments (data failure
per power fault is shown in the right side axis). We make four
major observations: 1) in the workloads with sequential access
pattern, we experience only 2% more data failure compared to
the workloads with random accesses. 2) In all workloads, we
observe larger number of FWA failures than shorn write failures.
3) We observe no unserializable write and flying write types of
failure. 4) We observe higher range of failures (especially FWA)
for Cello99 workload, which is mainly due to smaller requests
size in this workload (8KB) compared to random and sequential
workloads (512KB). This observation also verifies the results of
experiments presented in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10.
We conclude that the access pattern of the workloads (sequen-
tial or random) has no significant impact on the failure rate of
the I/O cache. In contrast, we observe a considerable impact of
requests size on the failure ratio.
5.5 Impact of IOPS
In this section, we evaluate the impact of requested Input/Output
Per Second (IOPS) (i.e., the number of operations that are sub-
mitted and responded by the SSD in one second) issued by the
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Fig. 11: Impact of access pattern on data failure (examining both synthetic and real
storage workload)
workload on the ratio of different types of failures in the I/O
cache (in RAID-1 configuration). To do so, we have performed
five experiments where the requested IOPS of the workloads is
fixed to 1.2K, 2.4K, 6K, 12K, and 20K in each experiment, then we
measure the failure ratio under power outage. The WSS of the
experiments is set to 380GB and the requests size varies between
4KB and 1MB which are distributed in a uniform random pattern.
In these experiments, we commit more than 120, 000 writes and
inject more than 3, 000 power failures to the SSDs.
Fig. 12 shows the results of these experiments (data failure per
power fault is shown in the right side axis). We make two main
observations: 1) both responded IOPS from RAID configuration
and failure rate are saturated when we increase the requested
IOPS to 6K or greater. 2) The shorn write failure is dominant type
of failure.
We conclude that in the workloads with high I/O load when
the responded IOPS saturates the failure ratio saturates, respec-
tively.
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Fig. 12: Impact of requested IOPS submitted to the SSD on number of data failures.
5.6 Impact of Sequence of the Accesses
In this section, we conduct experiments to evaluate the impact
of the workloads sequence of accesses on the reliability of I/O
cache. To this end, we have performed experiments under power
failures with different workloads where each workload mainly
includes 1) RAW, 2) WAR, 3) RAR, and 4) WAW accesses. The
requests size is between 4KB and 1MB which the accesses are
distributed in a uniform random pattern. In these experiments,
144, 000 write requests are committed to the subsystem where the
SSDs experience 3, 600 sudden power outage.
Fig. 13 shows the results of these experiments (data failure per
power fault is shown in the right side axis). We make four major
observations: 1) unserializable write failure occurs frequently in
the workloads with WAW accesses. 2) We observe large number
of shorn write failures in the workloads with WAR and WAW
accesses. 3) The workloads with RAR accesses experience both
I/O errors and data failures from FDC type under power outage.
4) FWA failure occurs in the workloads with RAW, WAR, and
WAW accesses where the minimum and maximum number of
such failure is observed in the workloads with WAR and WAW
accesses, respectively.
We conclude that the unserializable write failures mainly oc-
cur in the workloads with large number of WAW accesses under
10
power outage. In the workloads with RAR accesses, although
there are no write requests from the application level, but we
experience data failures due to the corruption of write operations
during promoting data to the I/O cache. The shorn write failure
occurs in all types of workloads while in the workloads with
WAR and WAW accesses such failure becomes dominant.
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Fig. 13: Impact of sequence of the accesses on data failure.
5.7 Impact of Disks Order in RAID-1 Configuration
In this section, we evaluate the impact of using SSDs from
different vendors in different orders in RAID-1, used in I/O
cache configuration, on the ratio of failures. In a mirrored (i.e.,
RAID-1) configuration with two disks, the first disk is called
“primary” and the second is called “secondary” [15–21]. To provide
data consistency in such subsystem, the controller periodically
compares the written data in both disks. In case of any incon-
sistency between primary and secondary disks, the primary one
is determined to store the valid data, and hence, the secondary
disk will be updated with the primary disk’s data. Furthermore,
in RAID-1 configuration, write operations are committed to both
primary and secondary disks, while read operations are only
supplied by the primary one. A read operation is provided
by the secondary disk when the primary one is busy due to
supplying previous requests [15–21]. Considering two above-
mentioned RAID-1 properties, using disks with different levels
of reliability (i.e., from various vendors) as primary disk in
mirrored configuration can highly affect the failure ratio. To do
so, we perform experiments under power failures with different
RAID-1 configurations. In these experiments, we employ SSDs
from various vendors providing different count of written logical
blocks (i.e., different aging level) and different levels of reliability
as either primary or secondary disks.
In the experiments, we commit more than 48, 000 writes to
the subsystem while the SSDs experience more than 1, 200 power
failures. Fig. 14 shows the results of these experiments (number
of data failures per power fault is shown in the right side axis).
We observe that when we use a low reliable SSD (e.g., Type-A
and Type-B) as the primary disk, the failure ratio increases by
52% (this is due to the fact that RAID-1 cannot mask total failures
in the SSDs). In contrast, using SSDs from Type-D or Type-C
as primary disk provides higher range of reliability by masking
data failures occurred in the secondary disk that provides lower
level of reliability. We conclude that the ratio of data failure
is significantly affected by the order of disks in I/O caches in
RAID-1 configuration where employing a low reliable SSD as the
primary disk can increase the data failure about 52%.
5.8 Impact of High Temperature Faults
In this section, we evaluate the reliability of I/O cache under high
temperature failures. To this end, we perform experiments where
the SSDs experience high temperature without any power failure.
In the experiments, we commit more than 65, 000 random request
to the SSDs. We increase the temperature of the SSDs up to 61
degrees Celsius (measured by SSDs S.M.A.R.T) and 64 degrees
Celsius (measured by temperature sensor in the test platform).
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Fig. 14: Impact of disks order in RAID-1 Configuration.
The temperature of the SSDs in the experiments does not exceed
the reported value in the datasheet.
Fig. 15 shows the measured temperature of the SSDs during
experiments. In this figure, we show the temperature of the
SSDs in two cases: 1) during running the workload without
any additional temperature faults and 2) during running the
workload with injecting high temperature faults. It can be seen
that, when SSDs supply the requests of the workload (described
previously) the average temperature is about 31 degrees Celsius.
In the experiments, we observe no data failure in the SSDs
by increasing the temperature of the SSDs up to 64 degrees
Celsius. This is due to the fact that although high operating
temperature increases the retention speed and failure rate, but
existing enterprise SSDs reduce the number of accesses to the
underlying SSDs (using throttling technique) resulting in reduced
failure rate due to high temperature [26, 39].
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Fig. 15: Disks temperature during experiments.
5.9 Impact of I/O Cache Write Policy
In this section, we evaluate the reliability of I/O cache with
different write policies under power outage. To this end, we
conducted four experiments in which the cache write policy is
set to 1) Write Back (WB), 2) Write Through (WT), and 3) Read Only
(RO). We examine the RO cache with two types of workloads
including 100% write (i.e., 0% read) and 50% read. The WSS of
the workloads in all experiments is equal to 380GB. We commit
more than 96, 000 requests to the disk subsystem where the size of
accesses is between 4KB and 1MB with a uniform random access
pattern. In each experiment, the SSDs experience more than 2, 400
sudden power failures.
Fig. 16 shows the results of the experiments which reveals
four major observations: 1) failure rate in the WB cache is more
than other cache policies by 20% (up to 32X). This is due to the
fact that WB cache buffers all requests (read and write) where
the write requests only reside in the cache until they become
evicted. In a WB cache, if a data failure occurs on a data within the
cache, such failed data will be evicted to the disk subsystem. Such
condition affects the written data and also further read accesses
which are responded from both cache and disk subsystem (i.e.,
hit or miss accesses). 2) Although WT cache keeps two copies
of data in both cache and disk, but data failure occurs in such
configuration which cannot be recovered by the WT cache. In a
WT cache, write requests first are supplied by disk subsystem
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and ACK is sent to the application, then the data is written
to the cache for supplying future requests. In this case, if the
written data in the cache fails, further read requests supplied
from the cache will fail. 3) WT cache experiences smaller failure
rate compared to WB cache. The reason is that in the WT cache,
there is no eviction from cache to the disk subsystem and hence,
no corrupted data will be evicted to the disk. On the other hand,
since WB cache keeps dirty blocks and evicts them to the disk
subsystem, failed data in the cache is propagated to the disk
subsystem. 4) Although RO cache does not supply write requests,
data failure occurs in the RO cache. In the experiment which we
run the 0% read workload on a RO cache, no read and write
requests are supplied by cache (i.e., there is no accesses to the
SSDs in the cache since all write requests are directed to the disk
subsystem where there is no further read accesses to them). While
in the second experiment with 50% read workload, the RO cache
directs writes to the disk subsystem while the read misses are
buffered in the cache (i.e., are written in the cache). Sudden power
outage during promoting the data to the cache may disrupt the
write operation which leads to data failure. In this case, further
read accesses which hit in the cache will fail.
We conclude that the I/O cache in WB, WT, and RO policies
experiences data failure where the failure rate in the WB cache is
more than others (by 20%). Furthermore, if power failure occurs
during promoting data to the cache, further read accesses will
fail.
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Fig. 16: Impact of cache write policy on the failure rate.
5.10 Measuring the Current of SSDs
In this section, the current of the SSDs is measured during 10
hours of experiments using INA219 module. In this experiment,
we commit more than 60, 000 write requests to the disk subsys-
tem with the SSD-based I/O cache. Fig. 17 shows the current
of the SSDs in two cases: 1) during 10 hours (as depicted in
Fig. 17a) and 2) only the first hour (as depicted in Fig. 17b).
Using this report, we find the state of the disk and check the
operations performing on the disk (idle, on, off, read operation,
write operation, power on recovery, and fault injection instances).
Then we decide when to inject the fault or when to start the
failure detection algorithm. As shown in Fig. 17b, in the first 2-
minutes, SSDs are idle and the current is less than 100mA. Then
from t = 120s to t = 400s, we have a reading phase (before each
I/O request) where we read all written data in the addresses that
we will rewrite to calculate the checksum of previously written
data into the SSDs. At t = 400s, when the reading phase finishes,
we start the fault injection interval. In each power outage, the
current of the SSDs is equal to zero. After each power outage, we
observe a power on recovery interval (as an internal operation
of the SSDs), in which we wait for the disk to become available
through the application layer.
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5.11 Failure Characterization of I/O Caches in Enterprise
Storage Systems
In this section, we gather the results of previous experiments to
indicate the frequency and workload dependency10 of different
types of failures (discussed in Fig. 3) as depicted in Fig. 18 and
Table 4. The main points of Fig. 18 and Table 4 are as follows:
1) As shown in Fig. 7, we observe numerous types of SSD
failures but none of them are affected by varying workload
WSS. In contrast, FWA, FDC, and shorn write failures are
highly affected by request type.
2) In the workloads with different rates of read accesses, the
ratio of FWA varies more than 100%. We observe similar
behavior for FDC and shorn writes where the range of these
failures varies respectively by 100% and more than 100%
under different ratios of read accesses (Fig. 8).
3) FWA and shorn writes are highly related to request size
where they vary more than 100% under different request
sizes (Fig. 9 and Fig. 10), while request size has no impact
on other types of failures.
4) FWA is partially affected by workload access pattern (less
than 5%). Similarly, we observe only a range of 5% and 20%
variation for FDC and shorn write failures under different
access patterns.
5) FWA and FDC are highly related to requested IOPS of the
running workload (by 100%), while shorn write only varies
by 75% under different requested IOPS. We also observe
other types of failures while they are not dependent to the
requested IOPS of the workload.
6) FWA, shorn write, and unserializable write failures are
highly related to the sequence of the accesses. We observe
significant (more than 100%) variation in the ratio of unseri-
alizable writes under different sequences of accesses, where
such failure only occurs in case of WAW accesses. Similarly,
FDC is also highly related to sequence of accesses.
7) We do not observe any relation between I/O error and dead
device failures with workload characteristics.
10. Workload dependency represents how different types of SSD fail-
ures are affected by different workload characteristics.
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8) In our experiments, we do not observe flying write failure
on the SSDs. However, we consider a small percentage of
workload dependency for this type of failure compared to
I/O error and dead device. This is because, flying writes
mainly occur due to wrong destination address which seems
to be related to workload characteristics.
According to the above-mentioned observations, we sort the
dependency of different failures to the workload characteristics
(Fig. 18), where FWA and shorn writes are determined as the
most workload dependent failures. Unserializable writes and
FDC are respectively less workload dependent failures compared
to two previous types. We determine the flying writes, I/O error,
and dead device as the failures with zero workload dependency.
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Fig. 18: Frequency and importance of different types of failures.
TABLE 4: Impact of workload characteristics on different types of SSD failures
observed in our experiments.
Section FWA I/OError FDC
Shorn
Write
Flying
Write
Unserial
Write
Dead
Device
Sec. 5.1 - - - - - - -
Sec. 5.2 > 100% - 100% > 100% - - -
Sec. 5.3 > 100% - - > 100% - - -
Sec. 5.4 < 5% - < 5% < 20% - - -
Sec. 5.5 100% - < 100% > 75% - - -
Sec. 5.6 > 100% - > 100% > 100% - >> 100% -
Workload
Dep.
(1: Low,
4: High)
4 1 2 4 1 3 1
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we evaluated the reliability of SSD-based I/O
cache architectures in enterprise storage systems. To do so, we
developed a Hardware-Software based reliability test platform
for the SSDs that injects the physical failures such as power
outage and high temperature faults that may occur commonly
in large-size datacenters. The proposed test platform measures
current, temperature, and power consumption of the SSDs and
detects various types of failure that may occur in the SSDs and
RAID configuration. We recognized different types of failures
namely: False Write Acknowledge (FWA), unserializable writes, Full
Data Corruption (FDC), shorn writes, flying writes, I/O error,
and dead device and measured the failure ratio in different
conditions. We evaluated the impact of workload dependent
parameters such as workload Working Set Size (WSS), request size,
request type, access pattern, requested I/O load, and sequence of
the accesses on the reliability of SSD-based I/O caches in RAID-1
configuration. We conducted extensive experiments with various
enterprise SSDs from top ten enterprise vendors and observed
that the failure ratio in SSD-based I/O cache architecture under
power outage is highly related to the I/O parameters of the
workload such as requests size and WSS of the requests while
other parameters such as access patterns have no impact on the
failure rate. We observed no data failure in the SSDs upon high
temperature faults. Furthermore, we observed that despite the
high reliability of RAID-1 configuration, it fails in case of data
inconsistency between disks which frequently happens upon
power outage in data centers.
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